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The purpose of this paper is to consider the relationship between ancient 
Greek philosophy and early Jewish philosophy in the particular concept of 
woman articulated by Philo, Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron), Moses Ben 
Maimon (Maimonides), and Leone Ebreo (Jehudah Abrabanel).1 While the 
concept of woman proposed by Jewish thought has often been approached 
through a study of religious writings or historical documents, there has 
been little written on the specifically philosophical components of the theory 
of woman’s identity. This paper will seek to demonstrate the similarities 
and differences in the concepts of woman in four Jewish philosophers who 
lived between the first and the sixteenth centuries AD. In addition, the 
relation between these views and the theories of P lato and Aristotle will be 
examined.
THE CONCEPT OF WOMAN IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY
As in so many fields in philosophy, the pre-Socratics set the direction of
the history of the concept of woman by asking the fundamental questions.
Research for this article has been supported by funds from the Social Sciences 
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When the fragments of their writings are examined it becomes clear that 
their questions fall into four broad categories which can be identified as: Op­
posites, Generation, Wisdom, and Virtue. In The Concept o f  Woman: The 
Aristotelian Revolution ( 750 BC-1250 A D )  I have given a detailed analysis 
of these categories of questions in early western Philosophy.2 To summarize 
briefly, the fundamental questions associated with each category are the 
following: Are male and female opposite or the same? W hat is the relation 
between a m other’s and father’s contribution to generation and sex iden­
tity? Are women and men wise in the same or different ways? and, Are men 
and women virtuous in the same or different ways? The answers to these 
questions filtered from Greek philosophy into Jewish philosophy. Specifi­
cally, the nature of woman from a philosophical perspective, which worked 
its way into the heart of Jewish considerations, included the Pythagorean 
table of opposites tha t associated a male with the left and female with the 
right, H ippocratean medical theory that associated the male with hot and 
female with cold, the preoccupation with the existence and nature of female 
and male seed, the association of the female with the lower and the male 
with the higher powers of the soul, and the question of the proper spheres of 
activity for man and woman. By “philosophical” here is meant an appeal to 
reason and the observation of the senses for evidence in support of a theory, 
rather than an appeal to faith, religious authority, or some other basis.
W ith P lato and Aristotle, the philosophical approach to the concept of 
woman took a giant leap forward beyond the original questions and frag­
ments left by the pre-Socratics. The leap consisted in a move from question 
to theory in the specific attem pt to develop a consistent answer to the four 
questions listed above across all the categories identified as opposites, gen­
eration, wisdom, and virtue. If the two concepts of “equality” and “differen­
tiation” are used, then the theories of sex identity which emerged in Greek 
philosophy can be identified as: sex unity (defends the equality and non- 
differentiation of the sexes), sex neutrality (assumes, but does not defend 
directly, the equality and non-differentiation of the sexes and a superiority 
of one sex over the other), and sex complementarity (defends a philosophi­
cally significant differentiation of the sexes, but maintains the fundamental 
equality of worth of both sexes). Empedocles suggests a sex complemen­
tarity theory, P lato is the founder of the sex unity theory and Aristotle of 
the sex polarity and sex neutrality theories. In subsequent theories of sex 
identity in Jewish philosophy the interplay of these different Greek theories 
is clearly seen.
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In order to aid the tracing of the similarities between the concept of 
woman in early Jewish philosophy and the theories of Plato and Aristotle 
the following summary lists the main points of their theories by category. 
While Plato was identified above as the founder of the sex unity theory, 
he also had some aspects of sex polarity in his works. Generally, sex unity 
is found in the Republic and Laws, and sex polarity in the Timaeus. The 
Symposium, with its central role for Diotima, supports the equality of man 
and woman in the category of wisdom.3
PLATO’S CONCEPT OF WOMAN 
Sex Polarity on Cosmic Level 
Male Female
Opposites Forms active, like a Father 
Generation  Souls fall first into male bodies
Wisdom  Forms are source of wisdom 
Virtue ---------
Receptacle passive, like a M other
Souls of cowardly or im m oral men 
fall into female bodies




Sex Unity in the World
Same identity by nature 
of the soul
Wisdom  Begins life stronger




Same capacity for 
philosophy 
Same education
Same function and 
virtue us workers, sold 
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Aristotle is described as the founder of sex polarity because he was the 
first philosopher to argue consistently that there are philosophically sig­
nificant differences between men and women and that man is by nature 
superior to woman. His theory of sex polarity is developed in the Gén­
ération o f  Animals, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Politics. The 
“dubious” Oeconomicus which was most likely derived from the Oeconomi- 
cus of Xenophon supported sex polarity in the separation of the public and 
private spheres of activity for men and women, respectively. Even though 
this text was not written by Aristotle, it was associated with his name well 
into the later mediaeval period. In addition, in the Organon and especially 
in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle developed a theory which became later 
a basis for sex neutrality, namely tha t sexual differentiation is not significant 
to logic which focuses on the science of the universal not of the particular 
or individual. Jewish philosophy appears to be influenced by these two dif­
ferent approaches to questions of sex identity. A summary of Aristotle’s 
theory follows:4
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPT OF WOMAN 
Sex Polarity in the
Man
Opposites superior contrary, hot like form, 
active
Generation  fertile seed, provides soul
Wisdom  rational soul capable of ruling 
irrational soul, wisdom, public 
speech
Virtue to rule by nature, public sphere 
of activity, superior friend
World
Woman
inferior contrary cold, like m at­
ter, passive, privation
no seed, provides body
rational soul w ithout authority 
over irrational soul, opinion, si­
lence
to obey by nature, private sphere 
of activity, inferior friend
Sex Neutrality in Logic 
Man Woman
Both included in species man
Sex distinction not philosophically relevant
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Now that the theories of P lato and Aristotle have been briefly summarized, 
it is possible to turn to a consideration of the four Jewish philosophers 
mentioned above.
p h il o  (13 b c -5 4  a d )
While it is difficult to ascertain a direct influence of Greek philosophers on 
Philo’s concept of woman, there are many striking similarities between his 
views and some aspects of Pythagorean thought, Plato, and Aristotle. Some 
of these views may have come through the Stoic writings with which he was 
familiar.
In the area of generation, Philo’s view exactly parallels th a t of Aristotle, 
who had argued th a t the female only provided a passive m aterial to the fetus 
while the male provided the active seminal cause. In Questions and Answers  
on Genesis he stated that:
the m atte r of the female in the remains of the m enstrual fluids produces the 
fetus. B ut the male (provides) the skill and the cause. And so, since the male 
provides the greater and more necessary (part) in the process of generation, 
it is proper th a t his pride should be checked by the sign of circumcision, but 
the m aterial element, being inanim ate, does not adm it of arrogance.5
The Aristotelian theory of the passive contribution of woman and the active 
contribution of man to generation is used in this passage to justify circum­
cision for men but not for women. In a different passage, from Questions 
on Exodus, Philo used this same distinction to justify the choice of a sheep 
for the Passover meal:
W hy is a sheep chosen? Symbolically, as I have said, it indicates perfect 
progress, and a t the same time, the male. For progress is nothing else than  
the giving up of the female gender by changing into the male, since the female 
gender is m aterial, passive, corporeal and sense-perceptible, while the male 
is active, rational, incorporeal and more akin to mind and thought.6
From these two examples, then, a similarity is seen between Aristotle’s and 
Philo’s theory of opposites and generation.
A further similarity is found in the category of wisdom. In Questions 
and Answers on Genesis Philo uses an allegory to identify man with the 
higher part of the soul and woman with the lower part of the soul: “In 
the allegorical sense, . . . woman is a symbol of sense, and man, of mind.” 7 
This same division is repeated later in the text: “the serpent is a symbol 
of desire, . . . and woman is a symbol of sense, and man of mind.”8 This 
identification of woman with the lower part of the soul and man with the
94 FLORILEGIUM 9, 1987
higher is continued in Philo’s analysis of the masculine and feminine. In the 
same text on Genesis he argues that within each individual’s soul there are 
masculine and feminine thoughts:
B ut as for the deeper meaning, in the soul of progressive man there are some 
thoughts th a t are masculine, and some offspring th a t are feminine . . . .  Which 
then are the masculine thoughts? Those which are emulous of wisdom and 
of all v irtue in general and of th a t which is truly good and alone is good. 
B ut the feminine kind, having the position of daughters, are under service to 
bodily needs and are under the dominion of the passions.9
This view th a t the feminine is “under the dominion of the passions” is sim­
ilar in structure to the claim of Aristotle th a t in woman “reason is without 
authority.” 10
Philo further follows Aristotle’s introduction of a principle of generation 
in the context of explaining the difference in their reasoning capacities:
It is fitting and proper for it to bring together those (elements) which have 
been divided and separated, not th a t the masculine thoughts may be made 
womanish and relaxed by softness, but th a t the female element, the senses, 
may be made manly by following masculine thoughts and by receiving from 
them  seed for procreation.11
The male is the provider of fertile seed, and the female as the passive re­
ceptacle for seed is a fundamental part of Philo’s concept of woman. He 
also devalued the female element in his derogatory reference to softness and 
womanish thoughts. So just as the woman played a passive role in gen­
eration, so feminine thoughts ought to be passive in receiving the active 
ordering of masculine thoughts in the mind.
Philo is often identified as a Platonic philosopher. In the concept of 
woman, however, he goes beyond Plato by using his theories to support a sex 
polarity position. In the following example Philo borrowed a metaphor from 
P lato 's Phatdrus  to further his theory. P lato had compared women's and 
m en’s living quarters to parts of the mind, but Philo extended the metaphor 
to include the following applications to women’s reasoning capacity:
And the woman’s quarters are a place where womanly opinions go about and 
dwell, being followers of the female sex. And the female sex is irrational and 
akin to  bestial passions, fear, sorrow, pleasure, and desire.12
Plato had argued on the contrary tha t women were capable of the same ra­
tionality as men. Therefore, Philo interpreted and extended P la to ’s example 
to support a sex polarity theory.
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Before passing to a different aspect of Philo’s concept of woman, it 
should be mentioned tha t he did not always divide the mind into male and 
female parts. Sometimes he divided it into two different levels of the same 
kind of being: the rational man and the sensible m an.13 He also sometimes 
divided it into two different orders of female parts: the higher part symbol­
ized by Sarah and Leah and the lower part symbolized by Hagar or Rachel.14 
However, far more significant to this study is the consistent separation of 
man and woman, male and female, and masculine and feminine in relation 
to the mind, and the equally consistent devaluation of the woman, female, 
and feminine in relation to man, male, and masculine.
One of the consequences of Philo’s sex polarity theory in the category 
of wisdom is tha t woman was more likely to be deceived than man. Her 
passivity made her unable to discern error. In Questions and Answers on 
Genesis he stated:
W oman is more accustomed to be deceived than man. For his judgm ent, like 
his body, is masculine and is capable of dissolving or destroying the designs 
of deception; but the judgm ent of woman is more feminine, and because of 
softness she easily gives way and is taken in by plausible falsehoods which 
resemble the tru th .15
The association of woman with the senses carries forward similar conse­
quences because the senses, which are easily deceived, can also then deceive 
the m ind.16 Once again the similarity between Philo and Aristotle is strik­
ing. Aristotle had implicitly argued that a woman was capable of only true 
opinion when in the Politics 1260a he stated that woman does not have 
authority over her deliberative faculty. This implies that woman could not 
carry forward the difficult reasoning process needed to acquire wisdom as­
sociated with the syllogism because of the weakness of her mind. The one 
difference in their views appears to be that Aristotle identified woman’s 
coldness and moistness and Philo identified woman’s softness as the source 
of her weak capacities for reasoning.
In the category of virtue Philo introduced an analogy between virtue 
as male and thought as female by emphasizing a difference in the relation 
of activity and passivity to  the two sexes:
And if anyone is willing to divest facts of the term s which obscure them  and 
observe them  in their nakedness in a clear light he will understand th a t virtue 
is male, since it causes movement and affects conditions and suggests noble 
conceptions of noble deeds and words, while thought is female, being moved 
and trained and helped, and in general belonging to the passive category, 
which passivity is its sole means of preservation.17
The association of the male with the source of movement and the female 
with the passive reception of movement is again a clear repetition of the 
Aristotelian position. The link between the passive contribution of the 
female to generation and a theory of virtue is made explicit by Philo in 
Questions and Answers on Genesis:
Giving b irth  is wholly peculiar to woman, just as begetting is to man. (Scrip­
tu re) therefore wishes the soul of the virtuous man to be likened to  the male 
sex rather than the female, considering th a t activity rather than  passivity is 
congenial to  him .18
Even though Philo argued tha t virtue is more properly identified with 
the male sex rather than the female sex, he did not claim th a t woman could 
not be virtuous. For example, he used Sarah as a symbol, of virtue in On 
Mating with the Preliminary Studies.19 However, there is a deeper sense in 
which the fuller or better virtue is associated with man because virtue is an 
active rather than  passive aspect of human nature.
Finally, Philo stated th a t there are different proper spheres of activity 
for the two sexes: the public sphere for man and the private sphere for 
woman. In Questions and Answers on Genesis he stated:
For to m an are entrusted the public affairs of state; while to a woman the 
affairs of the home are proper. The lack of her is ruin, but her being near at 
hand constitu tes household m anagem ent.20
In this differentiation of virtuous activity, Philo follows the arguments of 
Xenophon as well as the common practice of the time.
In summary, while there is no direct evidence that Philo was influenced 
by A ristotle’s writings on the concept of woman, his theory in the four 
categories of opposites, generation, wisdom, and virtue exactly parallels 
the line of argument found in Aristotle. In this way, Philo as one of the 
earliest Jewish philosophers participated in the transmission of a theory 
of sex polarity in western philosophy. His theory may be summarized as 
follows:
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Man Woman
Opposites Active, akin to rational
Generation Provides form, source
Wisdom Masculine thought is perfect 
wisdom
Good judgment
Feminine thought is ruled 
by paissions
Judgment susceptible to 
deception
Provides matter
Passive, akin to senses
Virtue Rules by activity,
Public sphere of activity
Obeys by passivity, 
Private sphere of activity
SOLOMON IBN GABIROL (1021-1058)
Historically there was much confusion about the identity of Solomon Ibn 
Gabirol. He lived in Spain and wrote in Arabic, a fact which led some 
scholars to  conclude th a t he was an Islamic or Christian philosopher. He 
was given the name Avicebron by the Latins, and it was not until 1845 tha t 
Solomon Ibn Gabirol was positively identified as a Jewish philosopher. His 
philosophy of sex identity falls strongly into the sex neutrality tradition. 
For this reason he is strikingly different from his predecessor Philo.
In his most central philosophical work entitled The Fountain o f  Life 
there is no mention of male or female in any context. Even God is simply 
referred to as the prim ary creator, rather than as the Father. One central 
reason for this sex neutrality orientation of the text may be the influence of 
Aristotle’s logic. In The Fountain o f Life Solomon Ibn Gabirol referred to 
Aristotle’s categories of form, m atter, genus, differentia, substance, species, 
actuality, and potentiality. W ithin the framework of Aristotelian logic only 
the species, man, is significant. Sexual differentiation refers to accidental 
aspects of substance, and therefore it does not hold a proper place in syl­
logistic reasoning. An implicit consequence of the spread of Aristotelian 
logic as a basis for philosophy is tha t sex identity becomes irrelevant for 
philosophy. Or, philosophy becomes inherently sex neutral.
The rigour with which Solomon Ibn Gabirol adhered to a sex neutrality 
is seen in his discussion of generation. In numerous discussions of generation 
he never mentioned sex identity. For example, he recorded the following 
answer to a question about the nature of generation:
Teacher: What is growth and what is reproduction?
Pupil: Reproduction is to engender a thing from its similar.21
Then, in another context in which one might expect a discussion of 
male seed els a highly reformed material of nutrition, Solomon Ibn Gabirol 
simply considers the relation between nutrition and reproduction without 
any reference to male or female.22 His philosophy is totally in the tradition 
of sex neutrality as first developed through an emphasis on the science of 
the universal found in Aristotelian logic.
However, in an interesting second level of thought, in the cosmic descrip­
tion of the relation of God and man, sexual differentiation is introduced in 
Solomon Ibn G abirol’s poetry. In The Kingly Crown he gave a free expres­
sion to masculine and feminine metaphors. Sometimes the soul was given 
a feminine personification in relation to a male God as for example when 
he stated: “My soul shall declare to Thee Thou are her former . . . .  She 
serves Thee as handm aid while yet in the body.”23 Then in another passage 
he inverted the masculine and feminine dynamic when he used the biblical 
description of God with a feminine personification in relation to himself: “0  
my God! . . . As a suckling child didst Thou nurse me.”24 In poetry, then, 
Solomon Ibn Gabirol did use sex distinctions already present in Scripture.
How can the radical difference between a sex neutrality in philosophy 
and a free use of sex distinctions in poetry or religion be explained? It may 
be tha t the influence of Aristotelian logic had begun to assume a fundamen­
tal importance in framing what was considered to be the proper subject of 
philosophy. A ristotle’s thought made its way to Europe in different stages. 
In the first phase, before the time of Philo, commentaries were written in 
Greek by followers of the Peripatetic tradition. Then from the third to  sixth 
centuries AD the neo-Platonic philosophers continued this tradition. Por­
phyry wrote an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, called the Isagoge. 
In the fifth and sixth centuries Aristotle’s works began to be translated into 
other languages. The Categories were first translated into Syriac. Then 
Boethius translated the work into Latin. It is the renewed interest in these 
texts of Aristotle’s logic tha t probably influenced Solomon Ibn Gabirol in 
his emphasis upon sex neutrality for philosophy.
By the ninth century, most of Aristotle’s works were translated into 
Arabic. These texts made Aristotle’s arguments about sex identity avail­
able to Avicenna and Averroes, the m ajor philosophers in the development 
of Islamic philosophy. Avicenna (980-1037) wrote the Kitab al-shifa which 
contained commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and 
Generation o f  Anim als , all of which contained im portant arguments in sup­
port of sex polarity.25 Then Averroes (1126-1198) wrote thirty-eight dif­
ferent paraphrases on the works of Aristotle which provided a rich source
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for the Greek philosophers’ theory of sex polarity. Significantly, however, 
Averroes also wrote a commentary on P lato’s Republic which defended à 
sex unity position.26 His own philosophy developed into an intriguing com­
bination of Aristotelian and Platonic theories. Basically, Averroes argued 
for a sex polarity orientation for the masses who followed religion, and a 
sex unity orientation for the elite who followed philosophy. In this choice he 
demonstrated a  similar separation of philosophy that was seen in Solomon 
Ibn Gabirol. The common thread is the belief that sexual differentiation is 
not significant for philosophy.
Before concluding this section on Solomon Ibn Gabirol it should be 
noted that in a book of ethical maxims entitled Choice o f Pearls there is 
a second-hand report of some of his views. For example, Xanthippe, the 
wife of Socrates, was described as being rebuked for her tearful emotions 
at Socrates’ impending death.27 This reference, first mentioned in Phaedo 
117b, was frequently repeated to support the contention that women are 
unable to govern their passions.
In another passage Solomon Ibn Gabirol is quoted as stating: “The 
best of animals needs the whip, the purest of women a husband, and the 
cleverest of men to ask advice.”28 This passage might be interpreted to imply 
that Solomon Ibn Gabirol thought that a woman needed a man to help her 
achieve self-governance. The location of the reference to woman between the 
forced obedience of an animal by a whip and the simple solicitation of advice 
among men is probably an accurate indication of the middle area in which 
woman was thought to be dependent upon man. However, it is impossible 
to conclude anything from these simple maxims concerning Solomon Ibn 
G abirol’s theory of sex identity. In general, then, his philosophy appears to 
assume a sex neutrality position which had its likely source in Aristotelian 
logic, while his poetry and religious and popular works allowed for a more 
free introduction of sexual distinction.
MOSES BEN MAIMON (1135-1204)
Educated in rabbinic schools in Egypt and trained as a physician, Moses Ben 
Maimon had access to arguments about sex identity through the writings 
of Philo, Hippocrates, and Galen. In addition he discovered the Greek 
philosophers through Alexander of Aphrodisias, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and 
Averroes. By integrating the theories of his predecessors into the context 
of Jewish religious thought Moses Ben Maimon articulated a modified sex 
polarity. He became known more popularly as Maimonides and as Rambam 
(Æabbi Afoses ben Maimon).
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In The Guide fo r  the Perplexed Moses Ben Maimon took P la to ’s view 
of the Mother Receptacle as a passive recipient of the Forms to emphasize 
the sexual identification with these two metaphysical categories: “P lato and 
his predecessors designated M atter as the female and Form as the male.”29 
Then, using Philo’s method of allegorical interpretation, he compared m at­
ter to an unfaithful married woman:
T he natu re  and the true reality of m atter are such th a t it never ceases to  be 
joined to  privation; hence no form remains constantly in it, for it perpetually 
pu ts off one form and pu ts on another. How extraordinary is w hat Solomon 
said in his wisdom when likening m atte r to a married harlot, for m atte r is in 
no way found w ithout form and is consequently always like a m arried woman 
who is never separated from a man and is never free.30
In another passage from The Guide this association of woman with 
formless m atter is extended beyond the limited category of an unfaithful 
married woman to  represent everything female:
Man (’ish) and woman (’ishshah) are term s th a t at first were given the mean­
ing of a hum an male and a human female. Afterwards they were used fig­
uratively to  designate any male or female among the other species of living 
beings. Thus it says: Of every clean beast thou shalt take to thee seven and 
seven, the man and his woman. It is as if it said male and female. Thereupon 
the term  woman was used figuratively to  designate any object apt for, and 
fashioned w ith a  view to being in conjunction w ith some other object.31
The female, or woman, had no identity alone, just as m atter could not be 
alone. Woman had to  be in union with a man in order to have an identity, 
just as m atter had to  be in union with form to be anything specified. On 
the other hand, the male or m an or form had an identity on its own without 
necessarily being in conjunction in the category of opposites to suggest a 
theory of sex polarity.
It is in the category of generation that Aristotle’s significance is intro­
duced. In The Medical Aphorism ,  in the context of a discussion criticizing 
Galen for not drawing the necessary consequences about the purity of male 
blood from the fundamental principle that the male is hotter than the female 
Moses Ben Maimon stated:
It is also possible th a t he (Galen) did not finish (reading and studying) the 
words of A ristotle, or th a t he didn’t see or know of them , and therefore didn’t 
mention them  when he com mented on this book. One may hear the statem ent 
of A ristotle and his words in this m atte r (in the original) in the eighteenth 
treatise of his book “anim alia” where he asserts: “The w arm th th a t is found 
in the female is weak, although occasionally some people claim the opposite
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of this, namely th a t the blood in the female is more abundant than  the male 
. . . .  They further think th a t blood in general has this same form, and it is 
sufficient for them  th a t it is moist and has the appearance of blood. They 
do not know, however, th a t (women) have very little pure blood containing 
good chymes and th a t the m enstrual blood is not at all pure” : This is the 
sta tem ent of A ristotle and it is the tru th .32
Moses Ben Maimon accepted Aristotle’s claim that the seed was a more 
highly purified form of blood. It was formed by a process of transform a­
tion of nutrition. In the “Discourse on Sexual Intercourse” he stated: “The 
sperm is a residue from the aliments left over and above what has been 
required for the organs during the third digestion.”33 Similarly, in The Med­
ical Aphorisms  he argued that the milk of mothers is also a purified form 
of nutrition: “Milk of the mother is the proper nutrition for the newborn 
infant, because its composition is the same as the blood from which he was 
created.”34 Therefore, in the question of male seed and female milk Moses 
Ben Maimon directly followed Aristotle’s theory.
The question of whether female seed exists appears to have been left 
open. Apparently following Galen, Moses Ben Maimon argued th a t female 
seed, if it existed, was infertile. In a passage from his commentaries on the 
Commandments he argued tha t women did not have to make an offering 
for an involuntary influx of seed, whereas men did. Woman’s significant 
contribution to generation was limited to menstrual fluid:
It is the emission of semen th a t makes a man liable for an offering, but if 
a woman has a sort of emission of semen, she is not a zavah, and it  is only 
a flux of blood th a t makes a  woman liable for an offering, whereas a flux of 
blood does not make a m an liable. The word ‘flux’ means only ‘flowing o u t’, 
and w hat flows out is not always the same thing. The Sages say explicitly: 
“a m an conveys uncleanness through semen, a woman through blood.”35
T hat Moses Ben Maimon did not consider the presence of seed in woman 
to be im portant is further attested to by the fact that in The Guide fo r  the 
Perplexed where he described male and female organs of reproduction, no 
location for the production of female seed is mentioned.36 Finally, in The 
Book o f  Women  he states: “The obligation to be fruitful and multiply is 
incumbent upon the m an but not on the woman.”37
In a rather fascinating integration of early Pythagorean theory which 
had probably been transm itted through Hippocratean writings Moses Ben 
Maimon used the association of the male with the right and the female with 
the left in a discussion about the determination of the sex of a fetus:
One should examine a male a t the tim e he reaches puberty. If his right testicle 
is larger, he will give rise to  male offspring; if it is the left, he will give rise 
to  females. T he same situation  applies for the breasts of a  girl a t the tim e of 
puberty.38
In another passage he focused on the location of the fetus in the uterus:
Male (fetuses), in the m ajority  of instances, are conceived by the woman on 
the right side (of the uterus) whereas the female (fetus) is conceived on the 
left side. T he reverse of th is situation only happens exceptionally.39
In the traditional Pythagorean association of female with left and male 
with right, the left is usually given an inferior identification with bad, dark, 
and so forth, and the right is given a superior association with good, light, 
and so forth. Therefore, there is often a hidden sex polarity within the
Pythagorean table of opposites.
In the category of wisdom Moses Ben Maimon did not make any direct 
references to A ristotle’s concept of woman. However, there are many simi­
larities in their structure of argument. In The Guide four common ways in 
which people are considered to be wise are listed: 1) the possession of ratio­
nal virtues; 2) the possession of moral virtues; 3) the possession of practical 
arts; and 4) the possession of cunning. Woman is mentioned only in relation 
to the third category: “The term  is applied to acquiring arts, whatever the 
art might be . . . and (to) all women that were wise-hearted,”40 By implica­
tion women were wise through a practical knowledge of particulars, rather 
than  through a reasoned knowledge of principles. In Aristotle’s philosophy 
this is considered the wisdom of true opinion rather than the wisdom de­
rived from the correct use of syllogism in demonstration. It is a degenerate 
form of wisdom because it is not of universals, which are the sole object of
scientific knowledge.
For Moses Ben Maimon both the rational and moral virtues demanded 
a three-step process: 1) knowledge of the Torah learned through tradition;
2) wisdom learned through demonstrative philosophical argumentation; and
3) a particular action determined to follow from a combination of the first 
and second sources. Concerning the first step, he argued that “women are 
not under obligation to study the Torah.”41 Then in relation to the second 
step he argued in an essay entitled “On the Management of Health” that 
women have no knowledge of philosophy:
Therefore you find these passions have a very great influence only on those 
individuals having no knowledge of philosophical ethics or the disciplines and 
adm onitions of the Law — such as youths, women, and foolish men. For due
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to the excessive tenderness of their souls, these people become anxious and 
despair.42
The view th a t women are “without authority” over emotions is repeated in 
The Guide:
As women are prone to anger, being easily affected and having weak souls, 
there would have been grave troubles, quarrels, and disorder in the house, 
if their oaths had been under their control . . . Therefore, the matter, with 
everything pertaining to it, is given into the charge of the master of the 
house.43
The “excessive tenderness” and “weakness” of women’s souls lead to the 
conclusion that a woman is virtuous more by obeying a virtuous man than 
by philosophically determining her own path or moral action.
The identification of the female with m atter and the male with form is 
also introduced in the context of a discussion of virtue to support the value 
of obedience for the female and ruling for the male. In the following passage 
from The Guide the “woman of virtue” is identified with obedient m atter:
As for Solomon’s dictum, a woman of virtue who can find . . . .  For if it so 
happens that the matter of man is excellent and suitable, neither dominating 
him nor corrupting his constitution, that matter is a divine gift. To sum 
up: it is not easy, as we have mentioned, to control suitable matter. If it is 
unsuitable, it is not impossible for someone trained to quell it. For this reason 
Solomon — both he and others — inculcated all these exhortations. Also the 
commandments and prohibitions of the law are only intended to quell all the 
impulses of matter.44
The implication of these thoughts about the relation of sex identity to  virtue 
is that woman is limited in her capacities for the full virtuous action that a 
man is challenged by Moses Ben Maimon to achieve. He does not conclude 
th a t a woman ought not to be taught about virtue. In Introduction to the 
Talmud  it is suggested that a woman can be taught in a simple way by 
using allusions and parables:
A third reason the Sages composed their Drachos in the form they did, is 
that the instruction of the nations’ masses must be through such allusions 
and parables, so that the women, youth and children will also benefit from 
it until it will eventually develop and perfect their intellects; and then they 
will comprehend and be enlightened to the actual meanings behind those 
allusions.45
It is not clear from the passage whether he would expect women to  enter 
into a progressive enlightenment as would happen naturally with youth and
children as they grew older. It is more likely tha t he believed tha t women 
would always m aintain a slightly inferior relationship with the knowledge 
of virtuous actions than  did men. If this is so, then Moses Ben Maimon 
argued th a t women and men are wise in different ways, and that the way 
a man was wise and virtuous was more inclusive and therefore superior to 
the way in which a woman was wise and virtuous.
Moses Ben Maimon wrote a great deal more about women. A book 
on the Code, entitled The Book o f  Women, is divided into four subjects: 
Marriage, divorce, the rape of virgins, and wayward women. These issues 
are also discussed in The Commandments  and in Book III, chapter 49 of 
The Guide fo r  the Perplexed. His thoughts on these subjects are more 
“homiletic” than  philosophical, and therefore they will not be included in 
the analysis given in this paper.
In conclusion, Moses Ben Maimon has been shown to have defended a 
thoroughgoing sex polarity which had striking similarities with the philoso­
phy of Aristotle, as well as with some aspects of Plato and the Pythagoreans. 
A summary of his concept of woman is as follows:
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Man Woman
Opposites hot, like form cold, like m atter
Generation contributes fertile seed, 
pure blood
contributes infertile seed, 
impure blood





Although Moses Ben Maimon wrote in Arabic, his works were soon trans­
lated into Latin and Hebrew where he exerted a direct influence on Al­
bert the Great, who decided that Aristotle’s works ought to be translated 
into Latin to become the basis for Christian philosophy as they had for Is­
lamic and Jewish philosophy. Albert the Great was the teacher of Thomas 
Aquinas, who subsequently developed a new philosophy based on Aristotle. 
In this way, Moses Ben Maimon was an im portant link in the transmission 
of Aristotelian rationale for sex polarity in the West.
LEONE EBREAO (1450-C. 1521)
The last of the four Jewish philosophers to be considered in this paper pro-
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vides an example of the new developments in neo-Platonism which sprang 
up during the emergence of Italian Renaissance Humanism. Leone Ebreo 
was born in Lisbon, educated in Seville, and moved to Naples to escape 
persecution as a Jew at the age of forty-two in 1492. Trained as a physi­
cian as well as a philosopher, he practised medicine first in Naples and then 
moved to Florence where he entered a school led by Marsilio Ficino. Many 
commentators have identified him with the name Jehudah Abrabanel, but 
there is some controversy about this identification.46
The revival of Platonism  by Ficino was in part a rejection of the scholas­
tic rigidity of Aristotle tha t had been incorporated into western university 
education. Since so much of the philosophical support for sex polarity came 
from an Aristotelian rationale, it is not surprising tha t the new turn  to 
P lato would effect theories of sex complementarity, which supports a view 
of the equality of the sexes along with a significant differentiation between 
them.
Marsilio Ficino, in his Commentary on P la to’s Symposium, reintro­
duced the figure of Diotima as a female guide for Socrates in the midst 
of philosophical disputation.47 Leone Ebreo, in his Dialoghi d ’amore, intro­
duced the female figure “Sophia” as a guide for Philo. Ebreo’s Sophia went 
far beyond P la to ’s and Ficino’s Diotima in tha t she was the main disputant 
among two characters instead of simply being one among many. She led the 
dialogue, and interacted with Philo throughout.
In a significant way the dialogue reveals a rejection of the Aristotelian 
model of sex identity. The male Philo represents the model of an individual 
who has difficulty controlling his emotions, while the female Sophia repre­
sents the model of a rational individual who does not give into emotions. 
Neither has achieved full self-governance, tha t is, integration of the emotions 
with reason, but the perspective from which they approach self-governance 
is the inversion of the Aristotelian model which had argued th a t in the fe­
male the reason was without authority over the emotions. In the following 
example from the dialogue we can see this interaction between a reasoning 
female figure and an irrational male figure vividly portrayed:
Sophia: And yet I would rather have your love governed by the reason from 
whence it sprang. Reason governs every person of worth.
Philo: But such a love can never possess a lover and, though we might call it 
love, such a love would not truly be love. True love controls the reason, 
as well as the entire being of a lover, w ith a most wonderful power and 
marvellous violence. It troubles the mind, the very throne of judgm ent, 
more than any other single human condition, cancelling from the memory 
all other things w ith which it might concern itself, and u tte rly  splitting 
a m an in two, making him, in tru th , adjunct of the beloved.48
In this description by Philo, the male has become an adjunct of the female. 
This inverted the suggestion of Moses Ben Maimon th a t a female is always 
m eant to be in conjunction with a male.
Philo continued his description of the emotional turmoil of the lover:
Philo: True love makes the lover an enemy of society and its pleasures; he 
is a lover of solitude and melancholy; he is filled with passions, girded 
w ith sufferings, torm ented by doubts, crucified by desires, nurtured by 
thought, harassed and cruelly afflicted by suspicion, stabbed by jealousy; 
he is w ithout respite in his distress, w ithout rest from his labors, a t­
tended always by sorrow and filled with sighs, never freed from anxieties 
and wants . . . Does it  seem rational to you, Sophia, th a t a man caught 
up in such a web cannot be made to  abide the laws of reason or the rules 
of prudence?
Sophia: Please, Philo, soften your words. I know only too well th a t lover’s pangs 
are as nothing compared to his protestations!
Philo: Your not believing them  proves only th a t you have not experienced 
them .49
The humour and give-and-take of the male and female disputants in the 
dialogue created a positive model of interaction for the concept of woman 
in relation to  m an in the category of wisdom. Neither Philo nor Sophia 
was always right, in contrast to the dialogue in which Diotima represented 
ultim ate tru th  for Socrates. In Leone Ebreo’s dialogue the two key figures 
were complementary to each other. So in this way his methodology suggests 
a model of sex complementarity.
In another area as well, Ebreo rejected the Aristotelian model of sex 
polarity. Aristotle had argued that women were capable only of friendships 
of inequality with their husband in a marriage. The inequality flowed from 
the superior nature of the husband in relation to the wife. Drawing upon 
the Aristotelian theory th a t there are three kinds of friendship (of utility, 
of pleasure, and of the good), Ebreo argued that there are in marriage all 
three levels of love:
Philo: Obviously the love of husband and wife is pleasurable. Yet it must be 
bound up as well w ith good. Indeed, it is for this reason th a t a m utual 
love survives the enjoyment of its delights, and not only persists but con­
tinuously grows through participation in the good. More, the good and 
pleasurable elements in m arried love are augmented by th a t of advantage
— for each of the m arried lovers ever derives benefit from the other, which 
greatly contributes to the nurture of their love. Thus, married love, being 
essentially pleasurable, is m aintained because of its connection with both 
advantage and good.50
106 FLORILEGIUM 9, 1987
SR P RU DEN CE ALLEN, RSM 107
The argument went further to make the claim that the love between a man 
and a woman must include an intellectual component. In this way Leone 
Ebreo elevated the relationship beyond a simple physical desire for union 
and separation:
Sophia: Perhaps when we have wearied of divine things, we can discuss our own 
hum an friendship with more open minds.
Philo: The proposition th a t happiness consists in the u ltim ate activity of the 
soul is both true and necessary. It is similarly true  and necessary th a t 
happiness consists in an activity of the most noble and spiritual faculties 
of the soul — the intellect . . . .  There are two forms of knowledge: one 
precedes and causes love — but such knowledge is not simply one; the 
other form is caused by, and follows love — this knowledge is simply one, 
and results in the enjoyment of perfect union . . . .  The same holds of the 
relation between men and women: from some knowledge of them  there 
springs love and desire which lead to the union in knowledge, which is 
the end of desire.51
The affirmation of the similar role of the intellect in man and in woman 
is clearly in the tradition of Plato, who had argued tha t women as well as 
men could reach the heights of wisdom and rule the republic. An obvious 
question th a t needs to be asked is whether Leone Ebreo’s neo-Platonism 
led him to adopt a more radical position of sex unity which denied the 
philosophical significance of any distinctions between the sexes.
There are some hints in the following passages tha t Ebreo did move 
away from a sex complementarity which defended the equality of the sexes 
while m aintaining the importance of distinctions between men and women 
towards a sex unity which abolished distinctions:
Philo: W hen two spirits are absorbed in spiritual love, their bodies desire to 
further the union so th a t no distinction whatsoever may obtain between 
them , with the union being in all ways complete . . . .  Finally, I wish 
to  inform you th a t whereas we before defined love in general, the proper 
definition of love of a man for a woman is the conversion of the lover into 
the beloved together w ith a desire for the conversion of the beloved into 
the lover. And when this love is mutual, it is defined as the conversion of 
each lover into the o ther.52
While the implication here is tha t the separate individuals lose their unique 
distinctions in this process of conversion, it could be argued th a t there 
are still two separate beings, the man who is converted into the woman 
and the woman who is converted into the man. However, in a subsequent 
passage Leone Ebreo described the union in terms which seem to imply loss 
of distinction:
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Philo: I know you to  possess virtue, intelligence, and beauty, adm irable and 
seductive, and my will desired your person, which reason correctly judged 
to  be noble, excellent and worthy of love in every way. My affection and 
love has transform ed me into you, begetting in me a desire th a t you may 
be fused with me, in order th a t I, your lover, may create with you, my 
beloved, a single being, with our m utual love making of our two souls, 
one, which may in the same way vitalize and inform our two bodies.53
This single soul for two bodies could suggest a new variation of sex unity in 
the context of Ebreo’s other views tha t female and male are of equal worth 
and dignity. However, it is more likely that he is simply using a romantic 
“topos” in the phrase “making of our two souls, one” rather than arguing
for a sex unity theory.
Another way to classify the direction that Ebreo’s theory of sex identity 
took is to make a distinction between two kinds of sex complementarity: 
fractional complementarity and integral complementarity. In the first kind 
of complementarity an individual of each sex contains a fraction of a whole 
being, which when joined to a member of the other sex makes up a single 
whole. Frequently theories of sex identity take this direction, by claiming 
th a t woman brings intuition and man reason, or man brings the public realm 
and woman the private, and so forth. This fractional complementarity is 
misleading and denies the fundamentally unique, complete existential nature 
of man and woman. In the dialogue by Ebreo it could be argued that he 
described Philo as bringing a fraction of the whole and Sophia the rest. In 
contrast to this kind of fractional complementarity, there is also a movement 
towards developing a theory of integral sex complementarity between men 
and women in which each participant enters the relationship as a whole 
person. Then the union remains a union of two separate and distinct beings. 
In this context Ebreo’s theory would be a step along the way, but it fails to 
reach integral complementarity.
Integral sex complementarity is always vulnerable to sliding into a sex 
unity view because of its emphasis on the equality of the two sexes. Sim­
ilarly, it is vulnerable to sliding into sex polarity because it argues that 
there are significant differences between women and men. Philo’s argu­
ments could be interpreted, then, as beginning with a view to support a sex 
complementarity but ending with a slide into sex unity.
The Dialoghi d ’amore were extremely popular. They were originally 
written in Italian but were soon translated into French, Spanish, Latin, and 
Hebrew. A copy was found in the library of Spinoza.54 Leone Ebreo, then, 
contributed to a shift away from Aristotelian grounds for sex polarity to a 
Platonic defence of the equality of the sexes in his description of the inter­
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action and theories of Sophia and Philo. While it may be argued by some 
critics that the use of female figures, rather than of real women, in philo­
sophical dialogues does not help the development of women as philosophers, 
it would seem tha t the significant number of women writers who emerged 
during the Renaissance could support the opposite claim, namely, tha t the 
presence of female figures paved the way for women actually to participate 
in philosophical debate. If this interpretation is correct, then Leone Ebreo 
was the first Jewish philosopher to help bring about a positive environment 
for women to become philosophers themselves.
CONCLUSION
In this paper four different early Jewish philosophers have been considered 
with specific attention to their concept of woman in relation to man. The 
following summarizes the different kinds of theories tha t they proposed:
Name
Philo
Solomon Ibn Gabirol 









sex neutrality  
sex polarity 
sex com plem entarity
It would seem th a t P la to ’s arguments for sex unity did not have any direct 
influence on the direction of Jewish philosophy with the exception of Leone 
Ebreo. On the other hand, there is a striking similarity between Philo’s the­
ory and A ristotle’s, although there were not direct references to the Greek 
philosopher’s concept of woman in Philo’s texts . It is only in Moses Ben 
Maimon th a t the direct use of Aristotle to defend a sex polarity is found. 
Aristotle’s development of logic was integrated into the philosophical texts 
of Solomon Ibn Gabirol, which may be the explanation for his adoption of a 
sex neutrality position. From these four examples it can be concluded tha t 
each Jewish philosopher appeared to develop his own position concerning 
sex identity without directly incorporating the previous work of other Jew­
ish philosophers. Maimonides may have been influenced by Philo, but he 
did not refer directly to his concept of woman; rather, he went to  Aristotle 
to defend his position. There is also the important question of the influence 
of other factors than the arguments of previous philosophers on the concepts 
of women studied in this paper. Obviously, there are many different strains 
of thought which enter into a writer’s formulation of a theory of sex iden­
tity. For Jewish philosophers the religious texts, practices, and historical
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situations of men and women all play a part. However, it seemed useful to 
extract the single philosophical thread from the whole in order to examine 
more closely the degree to which philosophical arguments played a part in 
their theories. The conclusion from this examination must be that Greek 
philosophy played a very important part in the development of theories of 
the concept of women in early Jewish Philosophy.
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